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About the Project International Forum for Expert Exchange on 
Countering Islamist Extremism (InFoEx) 
InFoEx is a joint project of the Migration, Integration, and Asylum Research Centre of the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
Over the course of 2019-2020, InFoEx is collecting inspiring practices from practitioners working in 
tertiary prevention in Germany and abroad, as well as insights from academics conducting re-
search in this field. 
It is the project’s objective to identify and generate empirical findings on processes of  
(de)radicalization, with a focus on their practical applicability for deradicalization efforts. To this 
end, the BAMF Research Centre initiated a consortium of research fellows who are embedded at 
local advice centers that work together with the BAMF Advice Centre on Radicalisation and various 
research institutions partnering with the BAMF Research Centre. These research fellows, along 
with the counselors working at the local advice centers, constitute the core stakeholders of InFoEx.
About the workshop in Berlin, March 26-27, 2019
Among the 35 participants were network partners of the BAMF Advice Centre on Radicalisation 
from civil society and government institutions, as well as practitioners and academics from Den-
mark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. To base the workshop on the 
needs of its stakeholders, research fellows embedded at local advice centers in Germany shared 
– in agreement with practitioners at their local advice centers – specific information needs and 
questions regarding counseling work in tertiary prevention prior to the workshop.
Contact
Sofia Koller, Project Leader InFoEx, Email: koller@dgap.org
Research Centre  
Migration, Integration and Asylum 
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This Issue Paper summarizes the main findings of the 
first workshop of the International Forum for Expert 
Exchange on Countering Islamist Extremism (InFoEx) 
workshop series. The workshop’s goal was to facilitate 
the exchange of lessons learned, inspiring practices, 
and knowledge gaps from programs and measures on 
countering Islamist extremism that are implemented in 
Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands.
 This Issue Paper explores (common) challenges as 
discussed in the workshop. Furthermore, it provides 
three “flashlight” cases from Germany, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands. They serve as examples of specific approa-
ches discussed during the workshop.
The workshop was based on a needs-based approach 
 and focused on the following five main topics: 
1. Planning, financing, implementing, and evaluating 
tertiary prevention programs
2. Multi-agency cooperation and clarity about roles bet-
ween different actors and stakeholders
3. Returning foreign fighters, focus on women and child-
ren
4. Role of mental health and psychological factors in (de-)
radicalization
5. Effectively communicating tertiary prevention to the 
public and stakeholders
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International Tour d’Horizon of Tertiary  
Prevention of Islamist Extremism
by Sofia Koller 
Based on the InFoEx workshop “International Tour d’Horizon of Tertiary Prevention” , March 26-27, 2019, Berlin
Key findings:
 
 . As the threat of Islamist extremism and terrorism continues to grow, so does the importance of preventing 
and countering it. Especially in the still young and complex area of tertiary prevention, international, tar-
geted exchange on “what works for whom, when, and how” is necessary to learn from experiences made el-
sewhere and to sustain lasting impact of programs and projects. This requires continuous exchange among 
practitioners and researchers alike, as well as structured knowledge transfer from research to practice, and 
vice versa. 
 . State institutions should avoid creating and financing parallel structures and programs but align different 
approaches and perspectives in a coordinated and coherent strategy.
 . Personal ties can be the basis for trustful working relationships between different stakeholders, but the res-
ponsible actors in every country should set clear guidelines about which information can, should, or must be 
shared regarding specific aspects of the work among involved agencies in their country.
 . Despite a lack of knowledge in some cases on how and where to obtain information before the return of 
male and female IS affiliates and their children, thorough preparations should include the wider family as 
well as the broader social environment such as schools and kindergarten.
 . For a substantial analysis of the role of psychological factors and mental health, more data needs to be coll-
ected and relevant findings need to be disseminated. 
 . Different stakeholders should pro-actively communicate their methods and goals, provide feedback on the 
effectiveness and acceptance of their programs in the target group, and share successful examples of their 
efforts while simultaneously outlining the limits of their work. 
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Workshop Results
Cell 1: Planning, financing, implementing,  
and evaluating tertiary prevention programs 
In the last years, a multitude of projects and programs 
have been developed in tertiary prevention. The – at 
times – rapid evolvement of projects and initiatives in 
some cases can result in the development of parallel 
structures that compete for financing. 
State institutions should avoid creating and finan-
cing parallel structures and programs. The responsible 
state actors should instead align different approaches 
and perspectives in a coordinated and coherent strat-
egy. Approaches should complement each other. 
To coordinate prevention work purposefully, it is neces-
sary to continuously communicate with each other about 
what is being done, when, with whom, and how. Shared 
goals should be discussed in a trustful atmosphere. Exis-
ting programs, projects, and measures need to be flexible 
enough to adjust to emerging trends. It is important 
to take this into account in both planning and financing, 
and while implementing and evaluating alike.
Transparency to other relevant stakeholders about the 
work being done is the basis for fruitful exchange. It also 
helps to identify what “works” with whom, when, and in 
which context, as well as implementing a “positive eva-
luation culture.” Such exchanges and assessments are a 
precondition for enhancing and maintaining the quality 
of the programs and projects. This way, it is easier to con-
sider already existing local projects and structures 
when planning and implementing new programs.
Programs and projects run by state institutions or civil 
society organizations both have their advantages and 
disadvantages. They should not be played out against 
each other or compete, but a culture of mutual respect 
should be fostered. Securing long-term funding is often a 
challenge for civil society organizations. Their operating 
based on yearly or bi-yearly contracts affects not only the 
sustainability of the programs, but also the opportunity 
to generate a long-lasting impact. Thus, the creation and 
maintenance of sustainable structures for PVE work is 
BAMF Advice Centre on Radicalisation & 
BAMF Migration, Integration, and Asylum 
Research Centre 
In 2012, the Advice Centre on Radicalisation was set up 
within the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF). With its telephone hotline and email service, 
the Advice Centre’s specially-trained staff offers support, 
guidance, and counseling for anyone concerned about 
a potentially radicalized person. In case the counselor 
has reason to believe that the individual concerned is at 
risk of potentially being radicalized or is in fact already 
radicalized, they refer the caller to a local BAMF partner. 
These partners provide tailored, in-person counseling 
with qualified and specially-trained personnel. The Ad-
vice Centre serves also as a central coordination and 
information hub within its German-wide network of 
civil society partners and relevant public authorities in 
the field of tertiary prevention. 
With the tasks of assessing both 
counseling work and cooperation 
as well as identifying areas for 
potential optimization, the BAMF 
Migration, Integration, and Asylum Research Centre 
carried out an evaluation of the BAMF Advice Centre and 
four of its local partners.
Based on the outcome of this study, several projects 
providing scientific accompaniment for the BAMF Advice 
Centre have been initiated by the BAMF Research Centre. 
For example, “embedded” research fellows have been 
employed with local BAMF partners and a two-semester 
qualification course is currently being developed to train 
counselors on radicalization-specific issues and good 
practices in tertiary prevention. Moreover, cooperation 
with different academic institutions and research insti-
tutes are aimed at enabling knowledge transfer between 
practice and academia and vice versa, and at enhancing 
the work being done in tertiary prevention. 
Contact: Milena Uhlmann 
Research Associate, BAMF Migration, Integration, and 
Asylum Research Centre
Email: milena.uhlmann@bamf.bund.de 
Germany
The volume of 
calls to the Advice 
Centre’s hotline 
has steadily grown 
and the structure of 
local partners has 
proved to be helpful 
in dealing with po-
tentially radicalized 
individuals. 
© Jana Burmeister | Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
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vital. Developing a strategy to move from temporary 
project financing to long-term institutional support could, 
for example, avoid “brain drain” of PVE professionals 
when the financial focus of policy-makers moves to other 
pressing issues. 
Cell 2: Multi-agency cooperation and cla-
rity of roles between different actors and 
stakeholders 
Many different actors are involved in tertiary prevention 
efforts. Among them are social workers, counselors, psy-
chologists, political and religious scientists, researchers, 
security agents, and policy-makers. These actors have 
different tasks, mandates, and objectives that can pose 
a challenge to cooperation and the clarification of their 
different roles.
In order to establish a well-functioning multi-agency 
approach, it is important to base information-sharing and 
local-level cooperation among the different stakeholders 
on a relationship of trust. Long-term cooperation can help 
establish personal ties that are the basis for trustful 
working relationships. A variety of existing exchange 
and debate formats on generalities as well as specifics of 
prevention exists. However, the complexity and volatility 
of tertiary prevention calls for regular, structured ex-
change between all actors working on tertiary prevention. 
This holds true for the exchange within state institutions, 
among practitioners, and among researchers as well as in 
between these groups. 
Different approaches and professional cultures result 
from different tasks, mandates, and goals. Thus, stake-
holders working in tertiary prevention should engage 
The Info House in Aarhus 
Since 2010, the Info House (Infohuset) in Aarhus brings 
together a multi-agency group working on cases related 
to radicalization and discrimination. It is jointly run by 
the East Jutland Police and the Aarhus Municipality. A 
trustful working relationship has been established, and 
the Info House has now been meeting every second week 
for almost a decade. 
The Info House’s goal is to assess individual cases and 
find out whether there is a criminal offence, whether 
to continue to monitor or to intervene, and if yes, how. 
Possible measures range from social counseling to social 
service interventions, mentoring, and psychological 
counseling. To evaluate the case, the case workers use  a 
standardized assessment measure that uses color-coding 
(green/yellow/red – see illustration) to sort indicators in 
terms of social relations and socio-economic indicators. 
While several factors contribute 
to the success of this model, poli-
tical support has been the found-
ation of the model’s success, and 
all social service interventions have municipal or other 
public funding. The Info House is a cross-sector approach: 
since all representatives of the various departments have 
the mandate to make decisions on the cases – there is 
no need for further top-down permission – decisions 
and their implementation can be made more quickly. All 
stakeholders are considered equally important. Further-
more, the model is connecting anti-discrimination work 
with prevention efforts. 
Currently, efforts are being made to build a similar 
approach in communities in other cities in Denmark. It is, 
however, challenging to transfer the Aarhus model – both 
in a national and international context – because, for 
example, of a historically different role of the police, the 
difficulty of establishing a trustful working relationship, 
or a lack of political support. 
Contact: Jesper Holme Hansen 
Consultant, Department of Children and Young People & 
working group “Prevention of Radicalization and Discri-
mination in Aarhus,” Aarhus Municipality 
Email: holme@aarhus.dk 
Dr Mette-Louise Johansen 
Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology,  
Aarhus University
Email: mlej@cas.au.dk 
Denmark
Awareness
briefings
Mentoring
National Hotline
w. Mun. of CPH
Community
outreach
Online 
workshops for 
4th and 8th 
grade in public 
school
Seminars for
professionels
Workshops to 
raise awareness
Public 
forums
Info House
Exit
Self-sustaining
In need of help
Intervention
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in continuous dialogue with each other. They should 
outline common grounds of their work, and develop 
an empathetic understanding for the respective per-
spectives, goals, and strategies. One possibility to achieve 
or improve such mutual understanding is to promote joint 
trainings and public-private partnerships. At the same 
time, multi-agency cooperation must not solely rely on 
personal relations or networks: responsibilities, person-
nel, and relationships among staff might change over 
time. The responsible actors in every country should set 
clear guidelines about which information can, should, 
or must be shared among involved agencies in their 
country.
At the same time, stakeholders should reflect on the 
side effects or unintended consequences of multi-
agency cooperation regarding information-sharing. It 
must be clear not only to all stakeholders, but also to 
persons being counseled in advice centers, which kind of 
information is shared, when, with whom, and for which 
reason, and in which kind of cases security agencies must 
be involved. Transparent presentation of the mandates, 
obligations, goals, spheres of competences, and limits of 
the different organizations’ work needs to be standard 
procedure. Transparency regarding obligations and limits 
of information-sharing is a necessary basis for trust-
building between all involved actors. This holds true 
especially in cases where a client is worried about the 
protection of personal information that he or she revealed 
to a counselor. By proactively informing the client about 
the mentioned obligations and limits, concerns and mis-
conceptions regarding sharing of data can be addressed 
and dissolved. 
For example, a client might lose trust in the counselor 
if he or she has the impression that detailed information 
is shared with security agencies and will possibly be held 
against him or her. At the same time, security agencies 
getting in touch with an individual without speaking to 
the responsible counselor first might destroy years of 
trust-building. 
In addition to improving cooperation and information-
sharing by building trust and setting clear guidelines, 
another key challenge for tertiary prevention actors is 
to communicate these efforts strategically to the target 
group or client to prevent any backfiring. Finally, tertiary 
prevention approaches should balance security and 
human rights perspectives. They should focus both on 
addressing challenges such as discrimination, margina-
lization, and deprivation, as well as initiating criminal 
prosecution when necessary. 
Cell 3: Returning foreign fighters, focus on 
women and children
Several hundred supporters of the “Islamic State” terro-
rist group (IS) as well as their families have returned or 
will be returning to their home countries from the territo-
ry formerly controlled by IS in Iraq and Syria. The limited 
numbers of individuals that have returned so far make it 
difficult to make conclusions about inspiring practices on 
how to deal with this heterogeneous group. In some cases, 
there is a lack of knowledge on how and where to 
obtain information before the return of an individual. 
Cooperation should be improved among relevant stake-
holders to facilitate information-sharing. 
Even where little information is available, thorough 
preparations should be made before a return. Procedu-
res should determine in advance who should and must 
be informed prior to the return (relatives, kindergar-
ten, school, etc.) and to identify which legal limitations 
exist, such as data protection. With regard to returning 
children, it can be more beneficial to also involve more 
distant relatives than the immediate family to facilitate 
reintegration into the family. Furthermore, it is important 
to apply different reintegration strategies depending 
on the children’s age. For instance, compared to todd-
lers, young adults who have potentially received milita-
ry training and have been exposed to intense Islamist 
indoctrination might respond differently to deradicaliza-
tion and reintegration efforts upon their return to Europe. 
This is also of high importance when communicating the 
actual, case-specific risk emanating from returning child-
ren to the public, aiming to minimize misconceptions and 
hostility toward these children. 
Upon their return, reintegration efforts could include 
rituals to help children with the transition into a different 
societal setting, based on experiences with former child 
soldiers in Rwanda.
It should be stressed that the risk that emanates from 
male as well as female radicalized and traumatized retur-
nees needs to be assessed for each case individually. Risk 
assessment is an important aspect of tertiary prevention 
work on and with returnees: several assessment tools are 
designed to assess risk of future violence. Furthermo-
re, multi-agency cooperation is crucial, combining the 
knowledge and experiences of political, social, religious 
science, and traumatology, among others.
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Cell 4: Role of mental health and psychological 
factors in tertiary prevention
Like radicalization, deradicalization can be understood 
as part of a psycho-social process. There is a lack of 
clarity and consensus on the role of mental health 
as a potential cofactor influencing the complex proces-
ses of radicalization and deradicalization. Extremists’ 
manifold personality profiles should be considered in line 
with other possible factors such as individual challenges, 
struggles, and motivations, to do justice to the complexity 
of the radicalization process. However, a phase of depres-
sion has been detected in numerous cases before a person 
committed a terrorist act. This observation should be 
scrutinized further. For a more substantial analysis, more 
data needs to be collected.
Family bonds and the micro-social environment are 
considered important factors in processes of radicalizati-
on, such as the father’s, mother’s, and siblings’ roles. Gro-
wing up in a dysfunctional family seems to be critical. 
A radicalized individual might also show signs of 
an ‘addiction’ to the group, be it online or offline. As 
extremist groups offer ‘toxic benefits’ – such as absolute 
truth or supremacy – to individuals, two questions arise: 
how to deal with these ‘toxic benefits’ and how to interest 
the person in the virtues of a pluralistic and democratic 
society. Counseling of radicalized individuals should help 
the client to find alternatives to what the radical group 
offers. It should support them, for example, in develo-
ping a sense of belonging and purpose in life beyond 
extremism and in offering incentives to change their be-
havior. At the same time, the individual must be willing 
to enter a counseling process. Some (potential) clients 
might not be open either to counseling or to psychological 
treatment. (Cultural) sensitivity is thus important for 
building trust before offering any support service. To this 
end, it can be beneficial to include cultural facilitators 
before and during the therapy or counseling sessions. 
Attention should also be paid to the special vulnerabili-
ty of women and girls, for example, regarding possible 
Child Protection Board
The Child Protection Board at the Dutch Ministry of 
Security and Justice is currently setting up individual 
return and risk assessment plans for children who are 
still in Syria or Iraq and who are likely to return to the 
Netherlands. 
Prior to their return, the board reaches out to their 
families and schools or kindergartens to retrieve first-
hand information about the social environment – such 
as family, school, kindergarten – into which the child 
will be reintroduced and if this environment might be 
detrimental to prevention efforts. A coherent approach 
can provide a framework where measures are implemen-
ted in such a way that a sense of belonging is generated 
for the children and can thus help returnees to adapt to 
their new environment. Experts on Islamic sciences and 
culture are brought in as well, for example, to identify 
possible radical tendencies in the environment and wider 
family. Based on these results, each plan addresses ques-
tions concerning who will take care of the child, which 
types of psychological assistance the child may need, 
which school the child might attend, and what security 
measures should be taken to provide safety to the child 
as well as to the communities. These return plans are 
transferred to the municipality, which ensures that the 
(financial) conditions are created 
to implement the plans on the 
child’s return. 
Besides this, the Netherlands has 
set up a pool of national experts 
that will screen the children on traumas and  
indoctrination as 
soon as possible 
after their actual 
return. The expert 
pool consists of 
trauma psycho-
logists, doctors, 
psychiatrists,  
infant mental 
health specialists, 
and Islamic scien-
tists. In addition, 
follow-up monitoring is provided until several years after 
a child’s return. 
Contact: Mattie van der Molen 
Child psychologist & Coordinator of the Dutch National 
Advisory Team on Juvenile Returnees from Syria or Iraq 
Email: m.molen@rvdk.minjus.nl
The Netherlands
 70percent  
of child returnees are cur-
rently under the age of five, 
and it is unlikely for children 
of this age to have received 
military training or substanti-
al ideological indoctrination.
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Sofia Koller is Research Fellow for counter terrorism and 
the prevention of violent extremism in the Security, Defen-
se, and Armaments program of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP).
experiences of sexual abuse and its consequences, such 
as traumas. Another challenge is the general a lack of 
psychologists in certain, mostly rural, areas.
Furthermore, there is a certain degree of danger in-
volved when psychotherapists are working directly with 
(former) Islamists. While this is not a feature unique to 
this situation – since working with violent criminals or 
right-/left-wing extremists poses a similar possible threat 
– this might diminish the willingness of professionals in 
this field to work in tertiary prevention. 
In addition to this, talking about mental health can 
have a political impact. There is a risk emanated by 
putting too much emphasis on (presumably existing) 
mental health issues: the extremist might hide his or her 
true state of mind to either mislead the assessment of his 
or her motivation to engage in extremist thought and/or 
behavior, or because he or she expects the psychologist to 
help diminish the sentence in case of a trial.
In general, there is a need for careful evaluation as 
to whether and how to adapt existing mental health 
definitions to the specific context of extremism. This 
could allow, for instance, a distinction between active 
and passive supporters of extremist groups. However, 
psychotherapists possess relevant expertise and can bring 
added value to the design of tools in tertiary prevention. 
Their knowledge can and should be used to further assess 
the importance of social environments and their impact 
on the psychological condition of individuals. At the same 
time, it is important to provide psychotherapists with 
practical guidance and knowledge that will help them to 
understand and assess the behavior of radicalized per-
sons and of statements that they make.
Cell 5: Effectively communicating tertiary pre-
vention to the public and stakeholders
Violent extremism and its prevention have been receiving 
intensified attention in public debates. At the same time, 
state funding of prevention programs has increased. Re-
sulting from this is a need for an effective communication 
strategy to explain how prevention programs operate and 
about their goals. Such strategies could help promote a 
better understanding and (more) acceptance of tertiary 
prevention programs. The different stakeholders should 
pro-actively communicate their methods and goals, 
provide feedback on the effectiveness and acceptance of 
their programs in the target group, and share successful 
examples of their efforts, as well as outlining the limits of 
their work. This communication strategy should also in-
clude tools on how to reach parts of the public sphere that 
hold strong reservations or a dismissive attitude towards 
this work.  
At the same time, programs should avoid stigmatiza-
tion. Programs should focus on content, such as radica-
lization, Islamism, and marginalization, rather than on 
specific communities. 
The Way Ahead
The workshop’s outcomes as summarized in this Issue 
Paper show that there are further efforts needed to 
identify inspiring practices and lessons learned that can 
be practically adapted in local contexts. Some of these 
key topics will thus be addressed in more detail in the 
workshops to follow: the second workshop of this year 
(May 23-24, 2019) will focus on psychological aspects 
and mental health, the third workshop (September 19-20, 
2019) on evaluation of tertiary prevention, and the fourth 
(December 5-6, 2019) on returnees.
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